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SARS coronavirus injected intratracheally into chick-
ens, turkeys, geese, ducks, and quail, or into the allantoic
sac of their embryonating eggs, failed to cause disease or
replicate. This finding suggests that domestic poultry were
unlikely to have been the reservoir, or associated with dis-
semination, of SARS coronavirus in the animal markets of
southern China.
A
n outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) occurred in Guangdong Province, People’s
Republic of China, in November 2002 and spread to
patients in 30 countries in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe,
and North and South America (1,2). As of July 11, 2003,
SARS had been diagnosed in 8,437 patients; 813 died (1).
A novel coronavirus was isolated in tissue culture or
detected by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) from multiple respiratory specimens in
many patients with SARS (2–4). The SARS-coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) is proposed to be the cause of this syndrome
on the basis of its association with human clinical cases
(3,4) and reproduction of pulmonary lesions in experimen-
tally challenged cynomolgus macaque monkeys (Macaca
fascicularis) (5). Furthermore, some of the first persons
identified with SARS-CoV infections were vendors in ani-
mal markets of southern China, which suggests a possible
animal source (6). SARS-CoV has been detected by real-
time RT-PCR or isolated from two wild mammalian
species, Himalayan palm civet (Paguma larvata) and rac-
coon dog (Nytereutes procyonoides), in a market in south-
ern China (7), but other studies in southern China
involving six provinces and Beijing, as well as sampling of
54 wild and 11 domestic animal species, did not find
SARS-CoV (8). The original source of this virus remains
unknown (3). The susceptibility of different animal species
within the animal meat markets is unknown.
Coronaviruses have been identified in numerous mam-
malian and avian hosts. Most widely studied and of com-
mon occurrence are coronaviruses reported in chickens
(infectious bronchitis virus), turkeys (turkey enteric coron-
aviruses), cats (feline infectious peritonitis virus and feline
enteric coronavirus), dogs (canine enteric coronaviruses),
swine (porcine hemagglutinating encephalomyelitis virus,
porcine transmissible gastroenteritis virus, and porcine res-
piratory coronavirus), cattle (bovine enteric and respiratory
coronaviruses), mice (Murine hepatitis virus), rats (sialoda-
cyradenitis virus), rabbits (rabbit coronavirus), and humans
(respiratory and enteric coronaviruses) (9). However, on
the basis of sequence data, SARS-CoV is sufficiently dif-
ferent from these known group 1, 2, and 3 animal and
human coronaviruses to be classified as a new group, group
4 coronaviruses (10). Most likely SARS-CoV originated
from an unknown animal reservoir, not from a benign coro-
navirus in the human population (10,11). 
Domesticated poultry species are major commodities
traded in the animal markets of southern China. Poultry
have been shown to be reservoirs for H5N1 and H9N2
avian influenza viruses that have crossed over and caused
infections in humans from 1997 to 2003, some with fatal
outcomes (12–14). Therefore, poultry should be examined
as potential hosts for infection and amplification of SARS-
CoV to determine any potential role they may have played
during the emergence of human infections in southern
China.
Groups of nine 3-week-old domestic geese (Anser
anser domesticus), 3-week-old domestic Pekin ducks
(Anas platyrhyncos), 4-week-old chickens (Gallus gallus
domesticus), 3-week-old turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo),
and 5-week-old Japanese quail (Coturnix coturnix japoni-
cus) were each injected intratracheally with 106.2 mean tis-
sue culture infective doses (TCID50) of Vero E6
propagated Urbani SARS-CoV per bird in a volume of 0.1
mL. The inoculum was the third passage in Vero E6 cells
from the original throat swab specimen of the patient. The
chickens were specific pathogen–free from an inhouse
flock. The other four species were conventional birds
obtained at 1 day (geese, turkeys, and ducks) or 5 weeks of
age (quail) from commercial hatcheries and raised on site.
Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were obtained on days 0,
1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 after injection from five birds per group
for virus detection by real-time RT-PCR and virus isolation
on Vero E6 cells. RNA for RRT-PCR was extracted with
the Trizol LS reagent (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA) in accor-
dance with the manufacturer’s instructions. Two hydroly-
sis probe type real-time RT-PCR assays, both targeting the
ORF 1b gene, were optimized and run on a Smart Cycler
(Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA) with the superscript platinum
taq one-step RT-PCR kit (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA). Real-
time RT-PCR tests included negative (noninfected tissue
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turkey enteric coronaviruses) and positive (Vero E6 propa-
gated SARS-CoV) controls. Two injected birds of each
species were euthanized. After necropsy, their tissues were
collected for histopathologic examination (all tissue types)
and virus detection (plasma, trachea, lung, spleen, kidney,
and heart) on days 2 and 4 after injection, and at termina-
tion on day 10 after injection. For determination of infec-
tion, serum was collected on days 0 and 10 after injection
from all birds and tested by indirect enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay for anti-SARS-CoV antibodies.
Antigen used to coat plates was tissue culture propagated
Urbani strain of SARS-CoV inactivated by γ irradiation
(3). Secondary “anti-bird” antibody (Bethyl Laboratories,
Montgomery, TX) for testing quail and goose serum or
plasma, and secondary anti-duck, anti-chicken, and anti-
turkey antibodies (Kirkegaard & Perry Laboratories, Inc.,
Gaithersburg, MD) for testing duck, chicken, and turkey
serum and plasma, respectively, were used. Two birds of
each species received uninoculated tissue culture fluid and
served as the sham-inoculated groups for real-time RT-
PCR, standard RT-PCR, virus isolation, and histopatholog-
ic and serologic assays.
To determine if SARS-CoV could grow in avian
embryos, 9-day-old chicken eggs and 13-day-old turkey
embryonating eggs were inoculated by allantoic sac route
and 17-day embryonating turkey eggs were inoculated by
yolk sac route; all were tested by virus isolation and real-
time RT-PCR for SARS-CoV. All laboratory procedures
and animal studies were conducted in biosafety level 3
agriculture (BSL-3AG) (15) facility with HEPA respirato-
ry protection and barrier clothing procedures for person-
nel. General care was provided in accordance with the
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.
To establish the comparative sensitivity of virus isola-
tion and real-time RT-PCR tests, serial dilutions of SARS-
CoV propagated in Vero E6 cell culture were tested for
virus reisolation in Vero E6 cells and detection of replicase
ORF 1b gene by real-time RT-PCR (16). Virus isolation
was slightly more sensitive, detecting virus in two of three
replicates at the 10-7 dilution; the real-time RT-PCR test
detected SARS-CoV in three of three replicates at 10-5 to
10-6 dilution, depending on primer sets. The real-time RT-
PCR assay detected virus in oropharyngeal swab speci-
mens from two chickens on day 1 PI (Figure). Real-time
RT-PCR results were confirmed by standard RT-PCR tar-
geting the same gene (primers: SARS clone 1b For 5′-
TgACAgAgCCATgCCT-3′, SARS clone 1b Rev
5’CAACggCATCATCAgA-3′) and sequencing of the
amplified product. No infectious virus was isolated from
any of the birds at any time from oropharyngeal or cloacal
swab specimens, plasma, or tissues. Histologic examina-
tion did not identify any specific lesions. No anti–SARS-
CoV–specific antibodies were detected in birds at 0 or 10
days after injection. Levels of SARS-CoV were detected
corresponding to the inoculated titers in chicken and
turkey embryonating eggs by real-time RT-PCR, but not by
virus isolation.
These findings suggest that poultry were unlikely to
have been infected during the recent SARS-CoV outbreak
and were unlikely to have played any role as amplifiers in
the animal markets of southern China. The low level of
virus detected by real-time RT-PCR from the chickens and
the failure to isolate virus from embryonating chicken and
turkey eggs suggest that the detected virus was residual
inoculum or nonviable virus and that substantial virus
replication in the poultry was unlikely. In addition, this
SARS-CoV was of low tissue culture passage, i.e., third
passage in Vero E6 cell, which minimized the potential for
increased cell culture adaptation and concomitant decrease
in vivo replication. Using the original or second tissue cul-
ture passage would unlikely have resulted in substantial
replication in poultry. However, the virus used in these
experiments, the Urbani SARS-CoV, had a 29-nt deletion
in the genome. Whether the GZ01 human virus or those
from civet cats and raccoon dog containing the extra 29 nt
would infect and amplify in poultry would be of interest
for future research.
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Figure. Ethidium bromide–stained agarose gel of ORF 1b stan-
dard reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction products
from oropharyngeal swabs of two chickens day 1 after injection.
Lanes: 1) Positive control (severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus from Vero E6 culture); 2) negative control (water); 3)
and 4) oropharyngeal swabs from chickens 337 and 341 at 1 day
after injection; 5) cloacal swab from turkey at day 2 after injection;
and 6) negative control from cloacal swab of turkey day 0 after
injection. Acknowledgments
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